ABSTRACT This article recovers the discussion of the relationship between religion, human nature and happiness in the Scottish Enlightenment physician John Gregory’s (1724–1773) A Comparative View of Human Nature (1765). Through examining Gregory’s best-selling but understudied text, this article explores how the Aberdeen Enlightenment’s own branch of the wider Scottish ‘science of human nature’, centred at the famous Aberdeen Philosophical Society, was as deeply concerned with the study of religion as it was the philosophy of mind. Gregory examined how the (...) purported cultural spread of dogmatic scepticism, associated by the Aberdonians with David Hume, threatened individual happiness and social tranquillity by removing the crutch of religious belief upon which the multitude (though not the philosopher) depended. In doing so, it suggests that the contribution made by physicians to the Scottish Enlightenment’s engagement with religion has been unjustly ignored. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1919 Edition.

Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...) location was not more central. The illusory AI was predicted from the known non-linearity in the retina and this is the first case of a clear cut type-type identity of a sensation and a neural process. Some implications for the concepts of the explanatory gap between neurology and consciousness and multiple neural realizations of conscious states and topic neutrality are discussed. (shrink)

Notre époque, traversée de courants mystiques, manifeste un intérêt tout particulier pour les idées du neo-platonicien Plotin. Pour le platonicien l'univers participe à l'idée. Platon considérait les choses comme le reflet de l'idée, ce que Plotin se refusait à admettre. La diversité dont la vie fait preuve atteste son inépuisable richesse, et si les choses dans leur état particulier sont imparfaites et défectueuses, c'est que chaque chose représente sa particularité d'une façon imparfaite. Le dualisme platonicien se retrouve chez Plotin; à (...) côté du monde de l'erreur et de l'apparence il situe celui de la vérité et de la réalité. Mais l'ordre des deux mondes étant différent, nécessairement les catégories qui y règnent diffèrent. Contrairement au monde du temps et de l'espace, où tout est désaccord et combat, l'accord et l'harmonie règnent dans le monde de l'idée. D'après Platon l'idée de l'être implique l'idée du repos. Pour Plotin le mouvement et le repos ne sont pas incompatibles. Il y a encore un point de divergence entre les deux philosophes. Tandis que Platon conçoit le bien comme idée, Plotin le superpose au monde des idées et l'en sépare. A l'oppossé du maître il n'était pas dualiste mais moniste. La conception platonicienne du bien est purement éthique, c.a.d. humaine, la conception de Plotin est plus cosmique. L'univers lui apparaît comme une trinité: le monde sensoriel, le monde idéal et l'unité suprême, et il leur découvre une base commune. Tout en admettant l'imperfection du monde, Plotin nie qu'il soit mauvais et méprisable. Il se tourne contre les Gnostiques chrétiens qui prêchent le mépris du monde, et s'oppose vigoureusement aux doctrines qui font des jouissances sensuelles l'unique but de la vie. L'exercice de la vertu n'est autre chose que le moyen de s'unir à Dieu. Pour Plotin la vertu n'est donc pas une fin en elle-même, mais elle est subordonnée à un but qui la dépasse. (shrink)

A translation of the earlier books of Galen's On Anatomical Procedures, extant in the original Greek text, was published by Charles Singer in 1956. The remainder, surviving in an Arabic translation, is here presented in a handsomely published English translation. A welcome supplement to the meagre Loch Galen.--R. W.

Lucretius' "On the Nature of Things" provides a vivid poetic exposition of the doctrines of the Greek atomist, Epicurus. This book offers an extensive description of the poem, with special emphasis on its cheerful version of materialism and on its attempt to devise an ethical system.

Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...) person. I take all of this to support the view that we (human persons) are identical with human animals. (shrink)

My subject is the place of myth in philosophy, not in religion. If I were dealing with the philosophy of religion, I should, of course, have much to say on the place of myth in theology; and what I have to say may have some bearing on this subject; but I am not dealing with particular dogmas of Christianity or of any other religion. My thesis is that when the mind communes with the world of values its natural and inevitable (...) language is the language of poetry, symbol, and myth. And, further, that philosophy has to deal with a number of irreducible surds which cannot be rationalized. They must be accepted as given material for reason to work upon. For example, we do not know why there is a world; we cannot unify the world of what we call facts and the world of values; there are antinomies in space and time which do not seem to disappear when we put a hyphen between them. Our reason–some would say reason itself— has reached its limits. We are driven to mythologize, confessing that we have left the realm of scientific fact. We give rein to the imagination, not exactly claiming with Wordsworth that it is reason in her most exalted mood, but hoping that the creative imagination may reveal to us some of the real meaning of questions which we cannot answer. (shrink)

The phrase philosophia perennis is said to have been first used by Leibniz. It has been adopted and freely employed by the Catholic Neo-Thomists, for whom it means a development of the Aristotelianism, modified by strong Neoplatonic elements, which Arabian scholars transmitted to the first Renaissance in the West. It claims also to be a return to the early Christian philosophy of religion, a fusion of Hellenistic and Jewish thought, the latter itself a syncretistic religion with many Persian and other (...) borrowings. The controversy, directed against various modern philosophies, has been conducted with great ability by such writers as Gilson, Maritain, Sheen, Watkin, Dawson and D'Arcy, whose books would perhaps have received more attention from independent thinkers, but for the suspicion which surrounds apparent attempts to revive the methods and inhibitions of the medieval schoolmen. There has been a parallel movement in the Orthodox Eastern Church, represented in Russian by Frank, Bardyaeff, Solovioff and Lossky. These writers are more Platonic and more fearlessly mystical than the Thomists. Origen in the East has more weight than Augustine. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the study of minerals from the Renaissance to the early nineteenth century in the light of the work of Michel Foucault on the history of systems of thought. In spite of a certain number of theoretical problems, Foucault's enterprise opens up to the historian of science a vast terrain for exploration. But this is the place neither for a general exegesis nor for a general criticism of his position; our aim here is the more modest (...) one of taking certain points from Foucault's study,The order of things, and seeing how far they can be extended into an area not explicitly considered in that work. (shrink)